This article aims to re-evaluate and clarify the significance of the contribution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the protection of irregular immigrants' rights. It argues that this Court has placed itself at the forefront of a renewed approach to immigration, confirming its potential to promote an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants' rights in Latin America. However, the actual protection of irregular immigrants' rights promoted by the Court depends on Latin American countries' capability to overcome several important challenges, in particular with respect to the compliance with judicial decisions and the effectiveness of the protection of rights. These challenges, which are not purely legal or institutional, are strongly dependent on the Latin American cultural, political, and societal context. They may, therefore, hinder the impact of a stronger human rights-based approach to the protection of irregular immigrants' rights in Latin America.
INTRODUCTION
Irregular immigration is not a new phenomenon. However, the flow of irregular immigrants 1 seeking a better life has been growing constantly in the past years. 2 From a human rights perspective, 3 regardless of the fact that they have formally breached immigration laws, these immigrants, as all human beings, have rights. Yet, the exact content and scope of these rights are not well understood. Part of the problem arguably lies in the general perception of irregular immigrants as individuals who are appropriately deprived of -or at least less entitled to -human rights. International courts and specifically regional human rights courts have an important role to play in shaping the content and scope of rights applicable to irregular immigrants. Their jurisprudence can considerably support a general recognition of human rights for migrants, including those in irregular situations regarding immigration laws.
In this sense, as suggested by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) "seems far more inclined to push for the recognition of migrants' rights". 4 The Court has indeed pushed the boundaries of its prohomine approach 5 to the realm of international migration. Interestingly, the Court's proactive position was not limited to refugees; it has also considered the protection of rights of irregular immigrants as falling within its sphere of competence. 6 As a result, the Court has placed itself at the forefront of a renewed approach to immigration via the recognition of irregular immigrants' human rights. It recognized that the right to non-discrimination and to equality of treatment, 7 as well as the right to a due process 8 and the minimum guarantees in case of detention 9 and expulsion, whether the IACtHR has the capability to promote an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants' rights in Latin America 12 and whether this protection can be deemed effective and efficient. It also seeks to clarify to what extent the principles developed by the Inter-American jurisprudence have the potential to have an impact on jurisdictions outside Latin America. 13 To achieve the principal objective of this article, the political and institutional framework of the Inter-American system of human rights will be examined in the second section. It is argued that the peculiar political context of Latin American countries has, surprisingly, favourably shaped the construction of the Inter-American system. The third section investigates the extent and significance of the jurisprudence of the IACtHR in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights. The impact of this jurisprudence within and outside the Inter-American sphere is critically analysed. The fourth section examines whether, despite its progressive character, the IACtHR still faces important obstacles, in particular with respect to compliance with judicial decisions and the effectiveness of the protection of rights. The analysis of these challenges is not only purely legal or institutional, but also refers to the Latin American cultural, political, and societal context, as compliance and effectiveness of rights appear to be strongly related to these general considerations. Finally, the article draws conclusions on the actual relevance of the IACtHR's general contribution to the protection of irregular immigrants' rights.
A PECULIAR POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK Before examining the content and scope of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights by the IACtHR, it is important to understand the context of the creation and development of this court within the Inter-American human rights system. It is suggested that the particularities of the Latin American continent have an impact on the recognition and effectiveness of the protection of human rights, including those of irregular immigrants.
Since its creation in 1948, 14 the Inter-American human rights system has evolved against the backdrop of many brutal dictatorial Latin American regimes engaged in systematic violations of human rights. 15 One of its readily apparent paradoxes is that many of its founding States had been ruled by oppressive dictatorships.
force on the 18 July 1978 and is today the main regional instrument for the protection of human rights in the Americas. Only 23 of the 35 OAS Member States have ratified the Convention, with the United States (US) and Canada notably among those States refusing to ratify it. 22 The ACHR has been complemented by the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), 23 and the Protocol to the ACHR to Abolish the Death Penalty. 24 In a similar way to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 25 the ACHR sets forth mainly civil and political rights. 26 Unlike the ECHR, the ACHR explicitly provides for freedom of association for labour purposes 27 and also encompasses a progressive development clause, according to which the full realization of economic, social, and cultural rights is to be progressively achieved by the Member States. 28 In the field of aliens' rights, unlike the ECHR, the ACHR expressly provides for "the right to seek and be granted asylum", 29 thereby codifying this right in the Inter-American system. 30 Both the ECHR and ACHR contain provisions relating to procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens lawfully staying in the territory of a State Party to the Convention, 31 and to the protection against collective expulsions of aliens. 32 In addition, in the European sphere, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a form of indirect protection (protection par 
ricochet)
33 of aliens' rights in cases of the existence of serious risk of violation of human rights in the context of expulsion, deportation, or extradition. 34 In contrast, the Inter-American system of human rights is twofold: it comprises the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereafter referred to as "the Inter-American Commission" or "the Commission"), 35 created by the OAS in 1959, and the IACtHR, established in 1979. The IACtHR has two main functions -adjudicatory and advisory. Concerning its adjudicatory competence, it should be noted that Member States shall accept the Court's contentious jurisdiction at the time of ratification or at any time thereafter. 36 There is no direct contentious mechanism under the Inter-American system. 37 Individuals can submit allegations of human rights violations to the Inter-American Commission, which will examine the case and decide on the admissibility and on the merits; 38 it may also propose friendly settlements. 39 Only the Inter-American Commission, and more rarely States, 40 can submit a report initiating the case before the IACtHR, requesting the Court's decision. 41 The Inter-American Commission tends, however, to systematically refer cases to the Court when the State in question has accepted its jurisdiction. 42 In its advisory competence, the IACtHR has adopted influential opinions throughout the years, notably in the field of the protection of aliens' rights. 43 At the time of the creation of the Inter-American system of human rights, the biggest challenges were related to the omnipresence of dictatorial military regimes notorious for their serious and widespread human rights violations. The situation in the 21st century has changed. With a few exceptions, such as Cuba, Latin American countries have engaged in extensive democratization and are trying to overcome the horror of the dictatorship period. 44 However, other problems have followed, such as endemic corruption, 45 emergence of mafias and uncontrollable organized crime, 46 and social inequality. 47 In other words, Latin America is still plagued by rampant violations of human rights. These are all issues which the IACtHR needs to take into account when imposing respect for human rights in the Latin American region, including respect for aliens' rights.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT JURISPRUDENCE ON
THE PROTECTION OF IRREGULAR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS The IACtHR developed an important line of decisions relating to the protection of irregular immigrants' rights. Its origins can be traced back to the Advisory Opinion OC-18, 48 which relied to a large extent on the concept of jus cogens. Despite its disputable legal basis (Section 3.1), this Advisory Opinion is considered an influential authority in the field, as it is fairly invoked both within and outside the InterAmerican system (Section 3.2). This was followed by a continuous development of the IACtHR's jurisprudence in the field, notably lying in the recognition of irregular immigrants' vulnerability (Section 3.3). As a result, the IACtHR was able to impose an ambitious and diverse range of obligations upon States (Section 3.4).
A controversial starting point: the Advisory Opinion OC-18
The IACtHR was not oblivious to the situation of irregular immigrants in the Americas. On the contrary, it acknowledged the difficulties endured by economic immigrants in search of better life conditions in Advisory Opinion OC-18. 49 The IACtHR considered that:
. . . undocumented migrant workers, who are in a situation of vulnerability and discrimination with regard to national workers, possess the same labor rights as those that correspond to other workers of the State of employment, and the latter must take all necessary measures to ensure that such rights are recognized and guaranteed in practice. 50 As emphasized by Beth Lyon, "in OC-18, the IACtHR substantially altered the definition of rights of unauthorized workers in the Americas". 51 In this Advisory Opinion, the IACtHR indeed ruled that although Member States can control the entry of, and deny work permits to, immigrants, once these persons are physically present in their territory and once a working relationship (even illegal) has been established, they are entitled to "labour human rights".
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The Court found the justification for such an affirmation in the application of the principle of equality and non-discrimination to irregular immigrant workers. According to the Court, this principle "belongs to the realm of jus cogens and is of a peremptory character, [and it] entails obligations erga omnes of protection that bind all States and give rise to effects with regard to third parties, including individuals".
53
To reach this conclusion, the Court built upon the principle of human dignity and the general obligation to respect and guarantee human rights.
54
The Court's legal arguments are not, however, fully convincing. Three main points can be challenged: the use of the concept of jus cogens, the recognition of obligations erga omnes, and the imposition of horizontal obligations by the Court.
3.1.1. The use of the concept of jus cogens The IACtHR seems to misuse the concept of jus cogens while applying it to all situations related to the prohibition of discrimination, including discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 55 Peremptory norms or norms of jus cogens "are rules of customary law that cannot be set aside by treaty or by acquiescence but only through the formation of a subsequent customary rule of the same character". 56 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides for a legal basis for these norms. It states:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
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To qualify the principle of non-discrimination as jus cogens, it would be necessary to show that this characterization is "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole". 58 The IACtHR drew upon the nature of the principles of equality and non-discrimination, which it considered as "fundamental for the safeguard of human rights in both international and domestic law". 59 It held that "[t]he principle of equality before the law and non-discrimination permeates every act of the powers of the State, in all their manifestations, related to respecting and ensuring human rights." 60 The Court did not offer more detailed evidence of the supposed acceptance by the international community of non-discrimination as a peremptory norm of international law. It imposed, however, its own interpretation of international human rights law, in all likelihood inspired by the positions adopted by Judge Cançado Trindade, then President of the IACtHR. 61 As pointed out by Andrea Bianchi, "reference to jus cogens may have been instrumental in reaching out to the United States, not a party to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights". 62 It is indeed interesting to note that the request for advisory opinion was formulated in very general terms by Mexico, without any specific reference to the US. 63 However, the Mexican demand implicitly related to the situation of undocumented Mexican immigrant workers in the US and the outcome of the US Supreme Court decision of Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board. 64 In this decision, the US Supreme Court held that undocumented immigrants were not entitled to back pay under domestic law in cases of dismissal motivated by the participation in trade union activities. 65 The IACtHR, on the contrary, held that these undocumented immigrant workers have rights arising from their employment. 66 Importantly, one of the consequences of the IACtHR's analysis is that these rights could also be evoked before US courts given that under this view, they are based on jus cogens norms and not on treaty-based provisions. 67 3.1.2. The recognition of obligations erga omnes The recognition of the erga omnes character of the norm can also be questioned. It follows from the IACtHR's reasoning that the general principle of equality, entailing a general obligation by States to respect and protect human rights without discrimination, has crystalized as a peremptory norm of international law or jus cogens. 68 The next step in its reasoning consisted of deducing that this general principle of equality, as per its nature, also generates obligations towards the international community as a whole, in other words, erga omnes obligations. 69 Accordingly, the Court affirmed that "the general obligation to respect and ensure the exercise of rights has an erga omnes character". 70 Once more, the Court gave little evidence to support this statement, 71 which, in addition, did not contribute to the clarification of the ongoing doctrinal debate around the relationship between the concept of jus cogens and the imposition of erga omnes obligations. 72 It is true that in the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) referred to the prohibition of racial discrimination as encompassing an erga omnes obligation. 73 It has indeed held that "the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination" were to be considered as imposing erga omnes obligations. 74 The ICJ's statement with regard to the erga omnes status of the prohibition of racial discrimination has been generally accepted and can be considered correct as a matter of law. 75 Nonetheless, it is still debatable whether non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality -a much broader principle in its scope -may be considered as amounting to such an obligation.
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There are a number of reasons for this scepticism. States can impose their own rules governing the attribution and acquisition of nationality. 77 States can also impose rules regarding the entry, residence, and expulsion of foreigners. 78 In addition, differences in treatment may be justified insofar as the individual behaviour of the foreigner constitutes a serious threat to public order, national security, or public health. 79 To be justified, the difference in the treatment of a foreigner entailing interference with his rights must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic society.
80 Accordingly, a difference of treatment based on the nationality of the individual may be justified, whereas a difference of treatment exclusively based on the race of an individual would not be objectively justified in a contemporary, democratic society built on the principles of pluralism, and respect for different cultures.
81 Therefore, it would appear that the erga omnes nature of the prohibition of racial discrimination does not extend to the prohibition of discrimination in general or even to the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
The imposition of horizontal obligations
Finally, the horizontal effect of this norm, as adopted by the IACtHR in its Advisory Opinion OC-18, 82 may also be questioned. In principle, a norm which is ordinarily destined to produce legal effects between the State and the individual (vertical relationship) may also apply to situations where both parties are individuals (horizontal relationship). Accordingly, this norm will create obligations and engage the responsibility of individuals, even though it was not ordinarily designed to apply to these situations. This is the case with regards to certain provisions established by international treaties relating to the protection of human rights. In principle, these provisions should only engage the State Parties to the international treaty. However, because of the nature of the obligations and rights contained in these provisions, they may also produce effects vis-à-vis purely private situations (between two or more individuals For instance, inspired by the German theory of Drittwirkung, 84 the ECtHR has recognized the possibility of the effect of certain ECHR provisions vis-à-vis individuals. 85 When the interference with a right guaranteed by the ECHR is not directly attributable to the State but follows from an action or omission of a third party (a legal person or a natural person), the responsibility of the State can be still be engaged in certain circumstances. Two main situations can be distinguished. On the one hand, international responsibility of a State may be engaged because of its inaction which had in turn enabled the breach of an ECHR provision by a third party. One example of this is the case of pollution caused by a private company because of the construction of a waste-treatment plant allowed by the State, even though the company failed to fulfil all the legal requirements such as obtaining a municipal licence. 86 On the other hand, a State may be internationally responsible because its domestic law rendered the breach of the ECHR possible. One example of this is the case of dismissal of employees who failed to comply with the condition of mandatory membership to a trade union provided by a closed-shop agreement. 87 The basis of the State responsibility in the European system also arises out of the general obligation to respect human rights. However, in the European system, this obligation is provided for by Article 1 of the ECHR. The 47 Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified the ECHR (and by doing so, they have also recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR).
This is not the case in the Inter-American system. The IACtHR affirmed in Advisory Opinion OC-18 that the obligation to respect human rights without discrimination gives rise to "effects with regard to third parties, including individuals". 88 In the context of the Advisory Opinion, this affirmation seems to arise out of the sole recognition by the IACtHR of this norm as jus cogens.
89 Peremptory norms of international law may under certain circumstances produce effects horizontally. 90 However, it is important to note that unlike the ECtHR, the IACtHR relies solely on the concept of jus cogens and does not discuss the horizontal effect of treaty-based norms. 91 As argued above, the use of the concept of jus cogens by the IACtHR in this Advisory Opinion is not supported by unquestionable evidence or authority, which weakens the recognition of the horizontal effect of this precise norm. 
An interesting middle point: the impact of Advisory Opinion OC-18
within and outside the Inter-American system Advisory Opinion OC-18 has had some interesting, although modest, repercussions. As Sarah Cleveland pointed out, this Advisory Opinion has an important, persuasive authority that can serve as a powerful interpretive tool for domestic and international courts and organizations, scholars, and decision-makers. 93 This has indeed been the case. In the Inter-American sphere, for example, the Inter-American Commission referred to Advisory Opinion OC-18 in the case of Margarita Cecilia Barberia Miranda v. Chile.
94 This reference was not only formal, but constituted the basis of the reasoning of the Commission relating to the nationality requirement for the practice of law by attorneys in Chile. The Inter-American Commission insisted that because non-discrimination is a peremptory norm of international law, States have a positive obligation to combat discrimination and to adopt all measures necessary to ensure equality before the law. 95 Applying the technique of consensual interpretation, 96 the Inter-American Commission arrived at the conclusion that the majority of OAS Member States did not require practising attorneys to have the nationality of the Member State in which they practise law. 97 Consequently, it restrained Chile's margin of appreciation and concluded that the State was responsible for the violation of the right to equal protection as a result of the application of a discriminatory norm that prevented the applicant from practising her profession "exclusively because she was a foreigner". Inter-American Commission based its legal analysis on the obligation of respect of human rights without discrimination. 100 It again explicitly referred to the IACtHR's Advisory Opinion OC-18. 101 The effects of Advisory Opinion OC-18 have also been felt across the Atlantic. In Souza Ribeiro v. France, a case about the expulsion of an undocumented Brazilian immigrant, two judges of the ECtHR, Judges Pinto de Albuquerque and Vučinić, explicitly referred to the Advisory Opinion OC-18 in a separate opinion. 102 In her partially dissenting opinion in Georgia v. Russia (I), Judge Tsotsoria similarly held that "the principle of respect for and protection of human rights on a nondiscriminatory basis is recognized as an international legal standard. Prohibition of discrimination has crystallised into a jus cogens norm". 103 It is noteworthy that -in contrast to her fellow judges in the Souza Ribeiro case cited above -she did not expressly refer to Advisory Opinion OC-18 to support her position.
Scholars have also commented a great deal on Advisory Opinion OC-18. Most of them have expressed critical views about the use of the concept of jus cogens by the IACtHR. 104 Some have, however, taken it at face value and built upon it to develop their own positions on other subjects, such as the applicability of human rights between private parties, 105 or ethnic cleansing. 106 Finally, certain Latin American States have acknowledged the importance of Advisory Opinion OC-18. In the request for an advisory opinion on migrant children presented by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay before the IACtHR, 107 Advisory Opinion OC-18 is expressly mentioned. 108 These States formally requested the IACtHR to:
[T]ake into special consideration certain general principles of international human rights law, among others: . . . the principle of non-discrimination, which prohibits unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights owing to different factors, such as nationality or the immigration status of the person and which calls for the consideration of identifying features of the person, for instance, age, cultural background and gender.
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This reference is by no means anodyne; it could be seen as reflecting the common belief of these States about the nature and the content of the principle of non-discrimination. According to this request, the principle of non-discrimination encompasses the prohibition of discrimination not only on the grounds of nationality but also in relation to immigration status. 110 This is tangible evidence of the impact of Advisory Opinion OC-18. The four founding States of Mercosur 111 (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) recognized the existence of the very pro-immigrant jurisprudence of the IACtHR, which is remarkable; however, how they implement this jurisprudence in their domestic legal orders is another matter. These States acknowledged that there was a lack of legislation and public policies in this area. 112 Therefore, they seem to seek to obtain a sort of stamp of legitimacy for their own legislation and policies. They were certainly inviting the IACtHR to adopt a general position on a very sensitive and important question, also affecting States that are not party to the ACHR, such as the US. 113 This is exactly what the IACtHR did. In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the Court recalls that its advisory function aims, "above all, to support the Member States and the organs of the OAS so that they are able to meet their relevant international obligations fully and effectively, and to define and implement public policies in the area of human rights".
114 Accordingly, Member States may be willing to refer to the IACtHR's jurisprudence to justify the need for new domestic legislation and policies in the field of immigration. States may also blame the Court for imposing these changes, which would just reinforce the common misuse of human rights in the political discourse.
A continuous development: the emphasis on the recognition of the vulnerability of irregular immigrants
The IACtHR has continued to develop its jurisprudence in line with a human rightsbased approach to immigration, notably via the recognition of the condition of vulnerability of irregular immigrants.
The IACtHR is not the only Court to recognize that immigrants and asylumseekers are subjected to conditions of extreme vulnerability. 115 The ECtHR has also recognized the vulnerability of aliens, as discussed below. However, it is suggested that the IACtHR seeks to promote an extended form of protection of vulnerable immigrants based on the expansion of the grounds of non-discrimination, in line with its Advisory Opinion OC-18.
In the case of Velez Loor v. Panama, 116 the IACtHR built on the argument put forward by Advisory Opinion OC-18, according to which undocumented immigrants should be considered as a "group in a vulnerable situation". 117 In this case, the IACtHR affirmed that this qualification is appropriate as irregular immigrants are "vulnerable to potential or actual violations of their rights and, as a result of their situation, they suffer a significant lack of protection of their rights". 118 The IACtHR reiterated this position in the case of Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia, 119 relating to the deportation of asylum-seekers, and the case of Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, 120 relating to the treatment of Haitian citizens in an irregular situation in the Dominican Republic and the protection of their rights. In Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the IACtHR also observed the "particularly vulnerable situation of Dominican children of Haitian origin" and urged the State to take this into consideration when establishing the requirements for late registration of birth. 121 In its Advisory Opinion OC-21, the IACtHR has extended even further the concept of vulnerability, affirming that migrant children may find themselves in a "situation of additional vulnerability" 122 as they are at the same time migrants and children and for this reason doubly vulnerable.
The ECtHR also takes into account the vulnerability of irregular immigrants. For instance, in the case of Aden Ahmed v. Malta, relating to the conditions of detention of asylum-seekers and irregular immigrants in Malta, the Court expressly considered "that the applicant was in a vulnerable position, not only because of the fact she was an irregular immigrant and because of her specific past and her personal circumstances, but also because of her fragile health". 123 In the case of Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 124 the ECtHR also highlighted the particular situation of "extreme vulnerability" of unaccompanied children. 125 In addition, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 126 the ECtHR underlined the vulnerability of the applicants while assessing the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in relation to the risk of arbitrary repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea. 127 Therefore, the vulnerability of the irregular immigrant's situation seems to be considered by the ECtHR as one of the criteria allowing for the interpretation of ill-treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR (provision prohibiting torture, inhuman and degrading treatments or punishments). 128 In Siliadin v. France, 129 a case concerning modern slavery, the ECtHR also insisted on the vulnerability of the victim while examining the existence of a violation of Article 4 of the ECHR (provision prohibiting slavery and forced labour). In a slightly different context, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR accentuated that asylumseekers (and not all irregular immigrants) form "a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection". 130 The decisions adopted in Tarakhel v. Switzerland 131 and V. M. and others v. Belgium 132 in 2014 and 2015, respectively, confirmed the main findings put forward by the ECtHR in the M.S.S. case, stressing the vulnerability of the situation of asylum-seekers in Europe. Accordingly, the ECtHR's approach generally corresponds to the position taken by the IACtHR.
However, besides recognizing the vulnerability of irregular immigrants, the IACtHR has also drawn the necessary conclusions relating to their precise situation. It considered that the position of vulnerability may lead to impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations, as irregular immigrants would be less inclined to seek police protection or judicial remedy for fear of being arrested and removed from the host country. 133 The IACtHR considered that "the legal and factual obstacles that make real access to justice illusory" 134 and, together with cultural factors and the power structure in the society, contribute to the reinforcement of this sense of impunity. 135 Therefore, the IACtHR seems to find the need to reinforce the affirmation that human rights, and notably due-process guarantees, also apply to irregular immigrants. 136 In this respect, the IACtHR clearly affirmed that States can take action against migrants who do not abide by the domestic immigration rules; 137 however, upon adopting the relevant measures, States should respect human rights and guarantee their exercise and enjoyment to all persons who are within their territory, without discrimination based on their regular or irregular status, or their nationality, race, gender or any other reason. 138 As a consequence, in contrast to the ECtHR's position analysed above, the IACtHR seems more inclined to promote an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants' rights, based on the enlarged application of the principle of equality and nondiscrimination. 139 The IACtHR added a new ground for non-discrimination based on the migratory status of the individual. By doing so, the IACtHR upheld and implemented the main argument put forward by Advisory Opinion OC-18. 140 This implementation is also complemented by the imposition of a variety of obligations upon States.
An ambitious destination: the imposition of a diverse range of obligations upon States
The IACtHR has placed itself at the forefront of the recognition of a diverse range of obligations upon States in the field of irregular immigrants' rights. The Court's approach is certainly original. As Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen has persuasively argued, "the Inter-American approach to reparations is, to say the least, innovative and forward looking". 141 It is submitted that this unconventional approach is even more noteworthy in comparison with the one adopted by the ECtHR in similar cases. In general, remedies imposed by the IACtHR have been classified in 13 different groups:
1. monetary economic compensation; 2. non-monetary economic compensation; 3. symbolic reparations; 4. restitution of rights; 5. prevention through training public officials; 6. prevention through raising social awareness; 7. prevention through legal reforms; 8. prevention through strengthening, creating, or reforming public institutions; 9. prevention through unspecified measures; 10. investigation and punishment with legal reform; 11. investigation and punishment without legal reform; 12. protection of victims and witnesses; and 13. other.
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In the specific field of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights, the IACtHR goes further than its European counterpart in imposing, for example, that the State:
[M]ust implement, in a reasonable period of time, a formation and training program that deals with international standards related to the human rights of migrants, due process guarantees, and the right to consular assistance for the personnel of the National Migration and Naturalization Service, as well as for officials that given their jurisdiction in the matter, handle issues related to migrant persons.
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Another common feature of the Inter-American case law is to impose on States the obligation to perform a "public act of acknowledgment of international responsibility and public apology". 144 Practical actions, such as imposing that "the State must organize a media campaign on the rights of regular and irregular migrants", 145 may also be required. Similarly, there may be the imposition of symbolic measures, such as building memorials in honour of the victims, 146 and the organization of a public ceremony broadcast by the national television network. 147 More controversial is the fact that the IACtHR can also order that a "State must, within a reasonable time, adapt its domestic laws". 148 It is submitted that this type of measure can be seen as a disproportionate interference in domestic affairs, although Articles 1(1) 149 and 2 of the ACHR 150 are interpreted by the IACtHR as entailing a general obligation of States to adapt their domestic legislation to the ACHR. 151 It is argued that all these measures of satisfaction seem to be connected to a broader point: the acknowledgement of the victims' suffering. 152 The explicit recognition of the violation of victims' rights and of their suffering can be seen as a powerful form of reparation in the context of severe impunity reigning in Latin America. Some of the actions imposed on States also have the goal of educating civil servants and governmental agents for the future. In addition, the recognition by the IACtHR of new categories of harm, such as the damage to the "life project" of the victim, 153 The IACtHR also allows specific reparations to be awarded not only to direct victims of violations but also to groups, considered as collective beneficiaries.
154 Irregular immigrants are considered by the IACtHR as a vulnerable group, 155 which is certainly at the origin of the imposition of forms of reparation benefiting the whole group of existent and future irregular immigrants, such as the obligation to organize and run specific training for civil servants working with immigrants.
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These forms of reparations are justified in law. As the IACtHR has stated, "it is a principle of international law that all violations of an international obligation which cause damage must be adequately make reparations". 157 Reparations are "measures tending to eliminate the effects of the violations committed".
158 They are calculated in relation to the characteristics of the violation and correspond to the nature of the damage (pecuniary or non-pecuniary). Reparations arise from States' obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights, and also encompass guarantees of nonrepetition. 159 Reparations can take the form of restitutio in integrum or full restitution, which implies the return to the state of affairs before the infringement. 160 However, in the large majority of cases and as a consequence of the nature of violations, per se, full restitution is not always possible or feasible.
161 Accordingly, international courts can order other forms of reparation. For instance, the ECtHR can impose measures of just satisfaction. 162 The IACtHR can also impose these types of remedies. However, its powers go beyond the European model as it may order a more diversified range of reparations.
Comparatively, the ECtHR can be seen as more conservative; it does not normally impose measures of this sort. Financial compensation is the main tool that the ECtHR utilizes when seeking to impose reparations. However, through the development of the doctrine of positive obligations, 163 the ECtHR can decide in concreto whether States have undertaken all the appropriate substantive and procedural measures to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights obligations. In doing so, the ECtHR is able to impose rather intrusive measures upon States, including the obligation to provide material conditions to the reception of asylum-seekers once there is a legal basis for such an obligation in domestic law. 164 Nonetheless, in the field of the protection of immigrants' rights, the ECtHR does not seem inclined to use the doctrine of positive obligations to impose a general positive obligation to protect human rights upon States. 165 Ultimately, it is submitted that the IACtHR imposes stronger obligations upon its Member States in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights. The root of this different approach may lie in the particularities of the Latin American societal context. Trivialization of violence and a widespread feeling of impunity are common features in many Latin American countries. This is a terrible scourge which young Latin American democracies are still facing. 166 Undoubtedly, this is reflected in the IACtHR's case law. This Court has dealt, for example, with violent massacres of indigenous populations, 167 kidnapping, torture and murder of street children by police officers, 168 forced disappearance, 169 and, in what directly relates to this article's subject, violent and unlawful killing of irregular immigrants and potential asylumseekers. 170 Extreme poverty, organized crime, and the development of a gang culture certainly do not help to secure respect for human rights in the region. Presumably, the IACtHR's response to violations of human rights in this societal context needs to be robust. Indeed, as pointed out by Burgorgue-Larsen and Ubeda de Torres, the IACtHR's approach to reparations "can be summed up in just five words: exceptional crimes justify exceptional reparations". 171 In comparison to the ECtHR, the InterAmerican case law on reparations appears to be far more aggressive; it may, however, suffer to a greater extent from problems linked to its judicial authority and to compliance.
A CONTRIBUTION PARTIALLY ERODED BY LEGAL,
INSTITUTIONAL, AND SOCIETAL LIMITATIONS The IACtHR has certainly developed an important jurisprudence aimed at imposing an extended form of protection of irregular immigrants' rights. However, it is still necessary to analyse whether this protection can be considered effective and efficient. It is submitted that the imposition of a variety of obligations upon States is not sufficient to eliminate limitations imposed by State practice. It follows that legal and institutional limitations may still restrain the full application of the Inter-American jurisprudence in this field. Three main limitations can be identified: restricted ratification of the ACHR; inadequacy of compliance with the IACtHR's decisions; and circumscribed effectiveness of human rights in the Americas.
Limited ratification of the ACHR
Limited ratification is undoubtedly one of the main problems faced by the InterAmerican system as a whole, which naturally, limits the scope of recognition and implementation of irregular immigrants' rights.
The fact that Canada and the US, the two wealthiest States on the North American continent, refused to accede to the treaty may be seen as a tremendous handicap for the legitimacy of this regional system. The US signed the ACHR in 1977 but it has never ratified it. Canada refused to accede to the ACHR. In addition to the negative image it creates, not having these two North American countries on board also leads to a dramatic impact on the funding of the IACtHR and the InterAmerican Commission. As Robert Goldman states, "the OAS is an organization in perpetual financial crisis". 172 Indeed, the vast majority of OAS members and the ACHR parties are developing countries. Therefore, funding the functioning of an international court with a reduced budget is a difficult juggling exercise. 173 It has been submitted that "continuing financial limitations may be hampering the tribunal's ability to achieve [its] goals". 174 The IACtHR may certainly face difficulties in providing great service as it has a limited number of attorneys to be instructed on cases, and it lacks permanent staff. The situation is even more complex in the context of an expanded workload due to an increased number of communications referred by the Inter-American Commission.
In addition, partial ratification of the ACHR creates a sort of à la carte system, opposed to the universality of human rights claimed by international bodies. 176 As pointed out by Jo Pasqualucci, "lack of universality complicates the functioning of the Inter-American Commission, which must apply somewhat different criteria depending on whether a State is or is not a party to the American Convention". 177 This is certainly also the case of the IACtHR, as the recourse to the concept of jus cogens in Advisory Opinion OC-18 confirms. Furthermore, the lack of universality indicated above may lead to a double standard of protection of human rights in the Americas. It can be argued that human rights would not be protected in the same manner all over the region, as some countries are not party to the Convention. This risk should, however, be counterbalanced by the fact that some of the States that are not party to the ACHR have their own domestic instruments of human rights protection. 178 These instruments are, in general, inspired by the UDHR, which has acquired the status of customary international law. Compliance may be understood as "a causal relationship between the contents of judicial decisions and State practice, leading to a convergence of the two". 180 According to Article 68(1) of the ACHR: "The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties." States are thus required to implement the measures imposed by the IACtHR; however, in reality, they fail to comply or only comply partially with the IACtHR's decisions.
It is suggested that compliance is inadequate in Latin America for three main reasons: the imposition of a far too vast a range of measures of reparations upon States, the lack of an independent monitoring body, and the attitude of States in practice.
First, imposing a wide range of measures of reparations is certainly necessary and beneficial to the victims of human rights violations. As examined above, these measures may encompass not only financial compensation, but also structural and symbolic actions. 181 Yet, the imposition of such measures alone may not be sufficient. Structural measures may be more lengthy and difficult to implement. Changes in domestic legislation may be in many cases dependent on internal strategies and political will. Furthermore, account should be taken of the economic and financial situation of Latin American States. Some States may feel less inclined to comply with obligations that directly interfere with their domestic budgetary plans, such as the construction of memorials for victims of massacres, or the introduction of new training programmes for civil servants. 182 On a spectrum, it seems that States are more inclined to comply with the obligation to pay financial compensation to victims, but less inclined to provide for the more forceful measures imposed. 183 For instance, in the Velez Loor case, concerning the detention of irregular immigrants, the IACtHR ordered Panama to pay compensatory indemnities within a period of six months, publish the judgment in national media, carry out criminal investigations, adopt measures to create establishments for the purposes of detention of irregular immigrants, implement an education and training programme on the human rights of immigrants, and implement training programmes on the obligation to initiate ex officio investigations. 184 Panama has not yet fully complied with the Court's orders. 185 In this case, the IACtHR insisted that the State should adopt measures to ensure that detention facilities should be "adapted to migrants, staffed by duly trained and qualified civilian personnel" to ensure that migrants would not be detained together with ordinary criminals. 186 This measure was ordered to ensure non-repetition of human rights violations. In 2013, only two detention centres had been established and the country had not given clear indications as to its compliance with the specific measures regarding adequacy of detention facilities and training of civil servants. 187 Similarly, in Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the IACtHR imposed a significant range of measures upon the State, including the organization of a "public act acknowledging its international responsibility and apologizing to the victims", and the adoption of "legislative, administrative and any other measures needed to regulate the procedure and requirements for acquiring Dominican nationality based on late declaration of birth". 188 The State has not yet complied with these two measures and it seems that there is no political will to fully implement them domestically. 189 compliance with the IACtHR's decisions. Despite the fact that the IACtHR recognized its own competence to monitor compliance with its decisions in the case of Baena Ricardo, this mechanism is not optimal. 191 The Court established a twofold mechanism: it encompasses a first stage in which the State submits a report to the Court; this is then followed by the Court's assessment of the State's engagements and progress in the field. Accordingly, this is mainly a judicial mechanism, as opposed to the political mechanism in place in the European system. Therefore, there is little place for political pressure in the Inter-American system, as the OAS General Assembly receives but does not analyse in depth the annual reports submitted by the IACtHR. As pointed out by Jo Pasqualucci, the General Assembly has never issued a comment on state non-compliance with Court judgments. 192 The IACtHR is thus responsible for imposing obligations upon States and for monitoring States' compliance with its own decisions. This can be challenging, particularly insofar as the IACtHR has a very limited budget 193 and cannot afford to have an extended team of attorneys to help with the analysis of country reports. For instance, in Pacheco Tineo v. Bolivia, relating to the expulsion of former refugees who have entered the country illegally, the Court imposed several measures of reparation, including specific training for civil servants. 194 The State has complied with one financial measure imposed, but the Court has not yet monitored compliance with any other specific measure, including the one relating to training of civil servants. 195 Thirdly, it is submitted that States do not always make the necessary efforts to comply with the IACtHR's decisions in practice. As observed by Cavallaro and Brewer: "Governments may openly reject certain orders, but even more commonly they assert that they will comply or are in the process of complying, yet fail to take the steps necessary to bring their practices into line with the requirements of the Court's judgment." 196 This seems to be the case in relation to measures adopted in the context of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights. For instance, Panama has not fully complied with the totality of measures imposed by the IACtHR in the Velez Loor case. 197 Similarly, the Dominican Republic has yet to comply with the totality of measures imposed by the IACtHR in the Bosico case, which was already 10 years ago. 198 Although, as Hawkins and Jacoby have persuasively argued, "international rules display some degree of effectiveness even when compliance is low (by inducing behavioural changes)", 199 the attitude of Latin American political elites is still not fully satisfactory. They may indeed consider respect for human rights as a Cavallaro and Brewer's viewpoint is of great assistance in this matter. They submit that advances in human rights practices in the majority of Latin American countries have historically depended on the ability of social movements and human rights advocates on the ground to exert pressure on authorities to implement change. 208 As one of the possible solutions, they advocate that the Court should be more concerned with "maximizing the relevance and implementability of its jurisprudence", 209 notably by making it more accessible to the public and also more in touch with the social context of the countries to which it is addressed. This is certainly the direction in which the IACtHR's case law should evolve, notably in the field of the protection of irregular immigrants' rights.
Secondly, it is necessary to take into account the considerable gap between law and practice often present in certain Latin American countries. Despite the adoption of comprehensive constitutions, expressly recognizing human rights, 210 the protection of these rights is not fully effective in practice. The Brazilian Constitution, for instance, proclaims an extensive catalogue of rights, encompassing civil and political rights, as well as economic and social rights. 211 This does not mean that in practice these fundamental rights are effectively guaranteed. For example, Article 5 (XLIX) states that "prisoners are ensured respect for their physical and moral integrity". 212 However, the reality of detention conditions in several Brazilian prisons shows that prisoners' physical and moral integrity are not effectively protected. In relation to migration detention, Law No. 6.815/1980 sets out the provisions for the imprisonment of foreigners for reasons of irregular immigration. 213 There are currently no detention centres or dedicated facilities for foreigners available in Brazilian territory. Irregular immigrants are thus detained in ordinary prisons, together with all sorts of criminals. Prisons in Brazil are well known for their undignified and overcrowded facilities. 214 Accordingly, common prisoners and detained migrants alike are subjected, in practice, to a situation that is certainly not in line with either the Brazilian constitution, or the ACHR. 215 should continue to establish its authority and impose necessary sets of obligations upon States, thereby elevating the level of protection of human rights in the continent; on the other hand, however, the Court should take into account the reality of the protection of human rights in Latin America, and act even more firmly on instances relating to non-compliance with its decisions by States.
